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CYBERSMEARS AND JOHN DOE: HOW FAR
SHOULD FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
ANONYMOUS INTERNET SPEAKERS EXTEND?
Jonathan D. Jones*
The first post about Jane Doe II went up on the AutoAdmit.com
website in late January 2007.' The message linked to a picture of the
Yale law student and encouraged other posters to "Rate this HUGE
,2breasted cheerful big tit girl from YLS." A flood of hateful speech
directed at her quickly followed. Doe II was not alone; she was one of
several people who became objects of derision on the AutoAdmit site, an
internet message board frequented by law students and prospective law
students from around the country that draws as many as one million
visitors a month.4  However, the posts about her were particularly
vicious.
AutoAdmit was, at the time, a forum with no moderator.5 It was
a place where any user could leave or respond to a simple text message,
where the owner recorded little information about his site's users, and
where nearly anything could be posted with impunity. 6 The only
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011,
Master's Student, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Journalism
and Mass Communication, 2011.
1. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See David Margolick, Slimed Online, CONDt NAST PORTFOLIO.COM, Mar.
2009, http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/1 1/
Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying.
6. See id. The description of the site is given in past-tense because in early
2009, the site's owner, Jared Cohen, began enforcing minor content restrictions
geared to clean up racist material and spam. He assigned moderators to remove
objectionable material. Id.
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requirement to leave a message was that a user had to register a
usemame and password, providing an email address for verification. The
email address and password used for registration were the only pieces of
information about the user that AutoAdmit's owner kept. With the ease
of obtaining web-based email addresses from the internet, it was not
particularly difficult for users to register with a fictitious email and have
a degree of anonymity.
That initial post about Doe 1I, while crude, would turn out to be
tame. Often the posts described users' desires to perform sexual acts on
Doe 1I and claims that she had incestuous desires.7 Several revealed
personal information about Doe 11.8 An email outlining her father's
felony conviction was sent directly to Doe II and at least one faculty
member at Yale Law School. 9 She unsuccessfully requested that the
website administrators remove the content. Then Doe II, joined by a
classmate who had also been discussed on the site, Jane Doe I, filed a
defamation, invasion of privacy and copyright infringement lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against more than
forty of the anonymous posters.1' Soon, Judge Christopher F. Droney
was grappling with a question that courts across the country would come
7. Doel, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
8. See Margolick, supra note 5. One poster, who called himself Vincimus, had
this to say about Doe II: "Anyone who goes to the gym in the afternoon has seen her
trapsing [sic] around in spandex booty shorts and a strappy tank top." Id. Another
poster, using the handle Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey followed with "Take your
goddamned cell phone next time and snap a pic, for Chrissakes." Id. Jane Doe I
faced similar slurs. In 2005, shortly after she graduated from Stanford, she became
an object of derision on the site. A poster named neoprag said "I'll force myself on
her, most definitely ... I think I will sodomize her. Repeatedly." Id. Another user of
the site, whose handle is :D, replied: "Just don't fuck her, she has herpes." Id.
9. First Amended Complaint, Doe I and Doe H v. Individuals, No. 307-00909,
(D. Conn. filed Nov. 8, 2007).
10. The website essentially had two operators. See Margolick, supra note 5.
Jarret Cohen, an insurance salesman, owned it. Anthony Ciolli, a University of
Pennsylvania law student, held the title of "Chief Education Director" and
contributed articles to the site. Id. The women appealed to Ciolli, because he was a
regular poster and his identity was widely known to board users, to remove the
objectionable content. Id. But Ciolli said he did not have the ability to do that, only
Cohen could, and that he forwarded their complaints on to Cohen. Cohen, the site
owner, had essentially abandoned it and did not remove the content. Id.
11. Id.
CYBERSMEARS AND JOHN DOE
to face with increasing frequency: when should courts pierce the veil of
anonymity so that plaintiffs can sue anonymous internet detractors? 
2
This Note will examine how courts, including Droney's, are
balancing First Amendment rights to anonymous internet speech against
plaintiffs' rights to discovery in civil actions. There has yet to be
guidance from a federal appellate court on the issue, with a variety of
tests developing primarily in district courts, intermediate state courts and
three state supreme courts.' 3 The issue is arising in courts across the
country as internet interactivity proliferates, with many newspapers
allowing comments below stories on their websites, message boards
devoted to nearly every topic, and the numbers of blogs exploding. By
one estimate, there were fifty million blogs on the internet by the end of
July 2006.14
Anonymity has a long history in American discourse. Most
famously, perhaps, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison
published eighty-five essays known as "The Federalist Papers" under theS • ,15
pseudonym "Publius." The essays, printed in newspapers in 1787, were
intended to persuade New Yorkers to support ratification of the new
Constitution. 16 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that anonymous
speech is a First Amendment right. 17 "[A]n author's decision to remain
anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
12. Doe I, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 252-57. Judge Droney ruled against withholding
the identity of John Doe 21, who posted under the pseudonym "AK47", even though
the internet service provider (ISP) had already given his identity to the plaintiffs.
Droney eschewed the tests which have developed in other jurisdictions and which
will be discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 99-101. He used his own test.
It did not balance the anonymous speaker's First Amendment rights against
plaintiffs right to proceed, nor did it require a strong showing of evidence to make a
prima facie claim.
13. See, e.g., Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006); Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451, 459-61 (Del. 2005).
14. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 21 (2007).
15. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
16. See generally McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 364-75 (showing several examples of
different North Eastern cities printing the Federalist Papers in 1787).
17. See generally McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-343.
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First Amendment.' ' 8 The Court has also ruled that the right to assemble
includes a right to do so anonymously, in that other group members may
know one's identity but the group should not be compelled to reveal its
members' identities.19 In Reno v. A CL U,20 the Supreme Court ruled that
First Amendment protections indeed carry over to the internet when the
court invalidated a portion of the Communications Decency Act of
199621 because it was not sufficiently narrow to prevent restrictions on
22protected speech.
Yet, despite all these protections, "the right to speak
anonymously... is not absolute. 23 It does not always cover defamatory
speech.24  And when people choose to use potentially defamatory
language on the internet, either anonymously or pseudonymously, this
First Amendment right of anonymous speech collides with a plaintiffs
25
right to seek damages for false accusations leveled against him or her.
It is difficult to speak anonymously in electronic communication without
leaving a small piece of identifying information behind-in the case of
internet speech it is the speaker's internet protocol (IP) address, which is
26
unique to each user. The address can be masked, but often people who
speak anonymously on the internet are unaware they are leaving a digital
27fingerprint behind and fail to cover their tracks.
To communicate with each other, every computer needs a unique
28IP address, which is typically assigned by an individual's internet
service provider, such as Time-Warner Cable, Verizon DSL, or a
university computer networking office. Armed with an IP address and a
18. Id. at 342.
19. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
20. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
22. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
23. See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
24. Id.
25. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe. Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
26. See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 147.
27. Id.
28. JACK GOLDSMITH & Tim Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS
OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 31 (2008).
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court order, a plaintiff can then subpoena the identity of the person who
has been assigned the IP address. As long as the IP address is not shared,
such as at a public coffeehouse with no security measures, then the
plaintiff has identified the anonymous speaker.
The result is that most anonymous speech on the internet is not
truly anonymous. In fact, the speaker's identity can be uncovered by
piecing together information logged by third parties through which the
29
communication passed. Courts are routinely facing this dilemma:
When, and by what standard, should the veil of anonymity be lifted?
Essentially four competing tests have developed in the previous
eight years: the good faith standard, a balancing test, the summary
judgment standard and the motion to dismiss standard.
THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD
The first test to gain favor was the so-called "good faith"
standard, which was a low bar. Through In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
30America Online, Inc., the court provided a three part test: First, the
party seeking the information must satisfy the court through pleadings or
evidence;31 Second, it has a "legitimate, good faith basis to contend" it is
the victim of actionable conduct;32 Third, the subpoenaed identity
information must be centrally needed to advance that claim.33
The court used this standard to allow the plaintiff in that case,
"Anonymous Publicly Traded Company," to access the identities of
several John Doe defendants because it demonstrated a "legitimate, good
faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in
the jurisdiction. ' 34  This standard is highly deferential to plaintiffs
29. Id.
30. No. 40570, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (rev'd, on other
grounds sub nom, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co,. 261 Va.
350 (Va. 2001)).
31. Id. at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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because it requires only that the court find that the plaintiff show a "good
35faith basis" for its prima facie case.
The problem with this type of test is the ease with which it can
be abused. Because it is so deferential, a plaintiff whose real interest is in
identifying the speaker to embarrass or harass him or her has to show
very little before the court will unmask the speaker. The test does not
make any mention of giving the defendant an opportunity to show the
plaintiff is operating in bad faith. Take for example the corporation
frustrated by negative publicity on a particular financial message board.
Its quickest route to silencing its critics is to unmask them, and that is
precisely what has happened under this standard. 36 The corporation is
not truly concerned with recovering damages from a libel verdict; it
wants to silence its critics.
THE BALANCING TEST
In one of the leading cases, Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe,
37
New Jersey's intermediate appellate court laid out a four-part test for
trial courts to use when examining whether to allow discovery of an
38
anonymous internet poster's identity. First, the court should "require
the plaintiffs to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that
they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure., 39 The anonymous posters should have a "reasonable
opportunity" to oppose the matter and notification should be made in the
same forum where the speech in question was initially made.n° Second,
the plaintiffs must "identify and set forth the exact statements" by
anonymous speakers that are alleged to be actionable.4'
35. See id.
36. See Lidsky, supra note 25
37. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Dendrite International Inc.
is a publicly traded pharmaceutical company. It brought suit against an anonymous
poster, John Doe, who was posting information in Yahoo!'s finance forum about the
company. Id. at 760.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Third, the court should carefully review the complaint and other
information included to determine whether the plaintiff has made a prima
facie cause of action against the anonymous defendants. 12 The plaintiff
must show enough supporting evidence for the complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss.43 Lastly, if the first three parts of the test are met, the
court must then "balance the defendant's First Amendment right of
anonymous speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented
and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's
• • ,,44
identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.
The Dendrite court's test was different primarily because of the
first and fourth elements: the notice requirement and the balancing test.
The balancing test forced New Jersey courts to consider the First
Amendment right of the anonymous speaker to leave messages on the
internet without revealing his or her identity against the plaintiff's right
to proceed with a civil case and to balance the harm done to the speech
rights should the speaker's identity be revealed.
The Maryland Court of Appeals adopted this same test in
Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,45 a case of first impression for
that state, with one small wrinkle. The Maryland court added a
requirement that reasonable time be given after notice for the anonymous
46speaker to respond. It found the balancing arm compelling, but not too
high of a bar: "We are cognizant that setting too loaw a threshold would
limit free speech on the Internet, while setting too high a threshold could
unjustifiably inhibit a plaintiff with a meritorious defamation claim from
pursuit of that cause of action." 47
By balancing the speaker's First Amendment rights against the
plaintiffs need to know the speaker's identity, the court must examine
whether the speech in question is of the sort that should be protected,
even when there is a prima facie showing of libel. While this step may
allow protection of some potentially defamatory speech, it is important
42. Id. at 760.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 760-61.
45. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 2009 Md. LEXIS 18 (Md. Feb. 27,
2009), available at http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2009/63a08.pdf.
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 45.
2009] 427
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because it forces the court to reconcile the particular claim against that
particular speaker's right to remain anonymous.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
49
Some courts have not been happy with this higher standard,
while others have avoided it altogether.50  In Doe v. Cahil 5 the
Delaware Supreme Court announced a new, more simplified test that
removes the balancing portion. First, "to the extent reasonably
practicable under the circumstances, the plaintiff must undertake efforts
to notify the anonymous poster that he is the subject of a subpoena or
application for order of disclosure. 52 The defendant must also have
reasonable time to respond.53 Second, the plaintiff must show that the
action can survive a motion for summary judgment and must provide
enough evidence for each element of the action in order to make a prima
facie case against the defendant.54
The Cahill court argued that the second element of the Dendrite
test, requiring that the plaintiff identify and set forth the exact
defamatory statements, was unnecessary because it is subsumed by the
summary judgment test.55 That is, in order to survive summary judgment,
the plaintiff will have to lay out the allegedly defamatory statements. It
also rejected the balancing test, or the fourth prong of Dendrite, on the
grounds that it added no extra layer of protection, that the summary
49. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005); Tendler v.
www.jewishsurvivors.blogspot.com, 164 Cal. App. 4th 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
50. See Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted a motion to dismiss standard instead of a summary judgment
standard. Wisconsin requires particularity in defamation cases so the court decided
that surviving a motion to dismiss would provide adequate protection against undue
First Amendment infringement. Id. at 687.
51. 884A.2d451.
52. Id. at 460. Patrick Cahill, a Smyrna, Delaware city councilman, brought a
defamation suit against an anonymous poster on a blog hosted by the Delaware State
News who left two comments under the pseudonym "Proud Citizen." Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 461.
54. Id. at 460.
55. Id. at 461.
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judgment standard itself provides a balance, and that the balancing test
muddies the analysis.56
The Cahill court also considered the "good faith" standard
because that was the basis on which the trial court had analyzed the
case.57 "We are concerned that setting the standard too low will chill
potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to speak
anonymously. The possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit
could intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments
or simply not commenting at all. 58 The court rejected the standard as
too permissive:
Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to
meet the good faith test applied by the Superior
Court, even if the defamation claim is not very
strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the
defamation action to a final decision. After obtaining
the identity of an anonymous critic through the
compulsory discovery process, a defamation plaintiff
who either loses on the merits or fails to pursue a
lawsuit is still free to engage in extra-judicial self-
help remedies; more bluntly, the plaintiff can simply
seek revenge or retribution.59
While the Cahill standard is not as lenient, and therefore as
dangerous to anonymous speakers, as the "good faith" standard, it is still
too easy on plaintiffs who wish to unmask anonymous commenters. By
leaving off the balancing prong it still allows for the unveiling of a
speaker's identity even if the speech is of a class that should be
protected. Take, for example, the anonymous blogger who writes
extensively on local politics. If, in a particular post, he is correct in his
factual assertions about a candidate on all but one key point, one that is
potentially defamatory, a prima facie case would be easy to make, and
therefore the court would unveil the speaker's identity. Yet repeatedly
56. Id. at 461.
57. Id. at 457.
58. Id.
59. Id.
2009] 429
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the Supreme Court has held that political speech should get the highest
60level of protection.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
The motion to dismiss standard is accepted by a small minority.
It was adopted in Lassa v. Rongstad6 by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin because of the nature of that state's libel law; 62 though the test
is one of only three, yet reported, to be adopted by any state's highest
63
court of appeal. The Wisconsin court considered the Cahill test but
opted instead to require that a court initially determine whether a claim
can survive a preliminary motion to dismiss before allowing discovery to
64reveal an anonymous speaker's identity. The reason for this difference
is that Wisconsin requires libel claims to be stated with particularity; thus
an initial analysis of whether a claim can survive a motion to dismiss
should satisfy the concerns laid out in Cahill, according to the court.65
ANON LURKING IN CYBERSPACE
The problem of anonymous internet speech colliding with
plaintiffs rights was easily foreseeable. A decade ago Professor
Froomkin argued for balancing First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech with the need to regulate criminal, defamatory or otherwise
66tortious speech. His analysis focused on the intertwined nature of First
Amendment rights and regulatory schemes that are hampered by
anonymity, such as criminal enforcement, regulation of campaign speech
60. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
61. 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006).
62. Id.
63. See Lassa, 718 N.W.2d 673; Cahill, 884 A.2d 451; Indep. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Brodie, 2009 Md. LEXIS 18 (Md. Feb. 27, 2009) available at
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2009/
63a08.pdf. So far these are the only three cases to make it to a court of last resort.
64. Lassa, 718 N.W.2d at 687.
65. Id.
66. See A. Michael Froomkin, Legal Issues in Anonymity and Pseudonymity,
15 INFO. SOC'Y 113 (1999).
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67
and tracking financial transactions. Yet Froomkin cautioned against
regulation of anonymous speech because of the difficulty in drawing a
line between what should be protected and what should not.68 He argued
that, "[o]nce down this slippery slope of regulation, it is notoriously
difficult to find a logical place to stop.
69
As courts began to unmask anonymous internet speakers,
especially those using the low bar in In re: Subpoena Duces Tecum to
America Online, Inc.,70 a new phenomenon began to emerge. Corporate
plaintiffs sought identities of speakers for the purpose of silencing them,
or exacting extra-judicial remedies.7' Professor Lidsky reported on the
use of courts to unmask speakers as part of corporate public relations
campaigns even though companies see no hope of collecting actual
72damages from the plaintiffs. Lidsky noted that, "[a]lthough
corporations that sue John Doe may never recover money damages, they
may still deem it economically rational to sue the pseudonymous posters
who make negative statements about them on financial message
boards."73
Professor Ekstrand examined how, after Dendrite, the tests had
been developed by the courts.74 She concluded that the post-Dendrite
outlook for anonymous internet criticism was good.75 Her analysis
showed that most courts had given deference to the long history of
anonymous speech in the United States and afforded it First Amendment
76protection. The conclusion is understandable given the New Jersey
court's fourth step in Dendrite, which requires the balance of First
Amendment rights against the plaintiff's right to proceed with an action.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 118.
69. Id.
70. No. 40570, 52 Va. Cir. 26, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 220 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan 31,
2000), (rev'd on other grounds sub nom, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co,. 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001)).
71. See Lidsky, supra note 25.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 877.
74. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online
Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405 (2003).
75. Id. at 425.
76. Id.
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But that view has only gained favor with a few courts after Dendrite,
most notably the Arizona Court of Appeals, which adopted a different
test that included the same balancing prong in Mobilisa Inc. v. Doe 77 and
78the Maryland Court of Appeals in Brodie v. Independent Newspapers.
Since Ekstrand's analysis, several new cases have been reported,
including Mobilisa and Independent Newspapers, addressing these tests.
Several are in line with Cahill, in which the balancing prong was
dropped. While those cases have been more favorable to anonymous
speakers than those decided under the pre-Dendrite good faith standard,
the trend of some courts to move away from the balancing test is
troubling because it makes it easier to unmask anonymous speakers.
There is also a view that Cahill is too high a standard for
plaintiffs to meet and that it fails to protect victims of online defamation
by failing to give them the necessary tools to bring their defamers to
court.79 Professor Malloy argues that the Cahill standard has several
fundamental flaws. In her view it fails to properly account for damage to
victims of online defamation, it makes the sweeping assumption that
readers will view blogs as opinion instead of fact, and it fails to provide a
proper judicial remedy. 0
Professors Lidsky and Cotter argue for a test, which they call the
"privilege analysis," similar to Cahill, but divergent in that it would
restore the balancing test applied in Dendrite.81  Like Cahill and
Dendrite, it starts with a notice requirement. The Lidsky and Cotter test
77. 170 P.3d 712, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). In Mobilisa, the appellate court
agreed to adopt the two-part test in Cahill, but a third prong was also added. The
appellate court held that, to obtain a court order compelling discovery of an
anonymous internet speaker's identity, the requesting party had to show that: (1) the
speaker was given adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the
discovery request, (2) the requesting party's cause of action could have survived a
motion for summary judgment on the elements of the claim not dependent on the
identity of the anonymous speaker, and (3) a balance of the parties' competing
interests favored disclosure.
78. 2009 Md. LEXIS 18 (Md. Feb. 27, 2009) available at
http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2009/63a08.pdf.
79. S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Bloggers and Defamation. Balancing
Interests on the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1187, 1193 (2006).
80. Id. at 1191-92.
81. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537, 1598-1602 (2007).
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describes the "summary judgment" standard in two separate parts:
establishing a qualified privilege to speak anonymously and then
82
overcoming that privilege. The court would first examine whether the
speech was "core First Amendment speech" or some other type of
83
speech. If it is core speech, then it gets a privilege, as does other
anonymous speech outside of the electronic communication context, that
84protects the speaker's identity. If that privilege is there, then the
plaintiff must overcome it in order to reveal the identity.85 And the
plaintiff does precisely that by making a prima facie showing of evidence
to support those elements of the plaintiff's claims that are within the
86plaintiff's control . For example, in a defamation case, the plaintiff
would have to make a prima facie showing that the communication at
issue is defamatory in nature. 87 The last step in this test restores the
balancing function and requires a court to weigh the competing interests
of the anonymous speaker and the party seeking to reveal his or her
88identity.
Several authors find the source of the problem in section 230
89 9immunity. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 199690
provides immunity for internet service providers ("ISPs")to tortious
claims that result from their users' actions. Professor Solove argues that
section 230 immunity has been interpreted too broadly with the result
being that website operators do not have any motivation to rein in
content.9' "It creates the wrong incentive, providing a broad immunity
82. Id. at 1599-1601.
83. Id. at 1599.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1600.
86. Id. at 1600-1601.
87. Id. at 1600.
88. Id. at 1601-02.
89. See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 159. Section 230 immunity refers to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2008) which
grants immunity to internet service providers for tortious conduct of their users. It
has been interpreted to protect website administrators and blog authors from liability
for comments left by their users.
90. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2008).
91. See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 159.
20091 433
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that can foster irresponsibility."92  His answer is to find a balance
between the anonymous internet speaker's First Amendment rights and
the privacy rights of individuals: 93
The solution is to create a system for ensuring that
people speak responsibly without the law's
cumbersome costs. The task of devising such a
solution is a difficult one, but giving up on the law is
not the answer. Blogging has given amateurs an
unprecedented amount of media power, and
although we should encourage blogging, we
shouldn't scuttle our privacy and defamation laws in
94the process.
Solove argues for a balancing between privacy rights and First
Amendment rights. In his view the balance between the two is tilted too-
heavily in the pro-free speech direction and it needs to be brought back
toward the middle to protect privacy.95 The argument against narrowing
immunity of internet service providers under section 230 is succinctly
stated by Jim Harper of the Cato Institute: "Holding ISPs liable for
customers' online behavior would lead them to charge more and suppress
beneficial content and activity--often zealously, sometimes over-
zealously.,
96
FINDING THE RIGHT TEST
With four distinct tests laid out by different courts in different
jurisdictions, it is necessary to analyze whether lower courts are favoring
one test over another or applying them haphazardly. And if lower courts
are applying the tests in a more uniform fashion, what is the common
theme? Also, one must consider if it is possible for a one-size-fits-all
approach that deals with defendants in defamation actions, potential
witnesses in liability actions, and copyright infringement claims, to
revealing anonymous internet speakers to actually work.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 160.
94. Id. at 159.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Jim Harper, Against ISP Liability, REGULATION, Spring 2005, at 32.
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To answer these questions this Note looks to appellate court
decisions post-Cahill and select trial court opinions in cases involving
anonymous internet speakers and using IP addresses to reveal identities.
Specifically, the analysis looks at how courts have interpreted the four
tests that have been handed down by appellate courts and whether they
are faithfully adhering to all or parts of those tests. The focus will be on
how three recently reported cases Mobilisa,97 Lassa,98 and Krinsky v.
Doe 6,99 which each offer a new variation on the Cahill or Dendrite tests,
fit into the spectrum of cases. The lower court cases included will
primarily be those that have been reported to the Media Law Reporter
because it is a clearinghouse for such cases and locating those which
have not been reported would be nearly impossible."'
Given the non-trivial differences between these standards, courts
are struggling to find consistency in how to apply them.'01 For example,
a New York trial court recently adopted the balancing prong, following
the logic of the Dendrite court, when it allowed the revelation of the
identity of an anonymous commenter on a newspaper's website.' °2 The
court offered no comment on why it found the balancing prong
103
necessary.
Just weeks earlier, Judge Droney opted not to apply the
balancing prong in his examination of whether the identity of poster
97. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
98. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006).
99. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
100. This note will not include every case adjudicated solely by a trial-level
court because those cases lack the authority of precedent, even though some, such as
In re: Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 52 Va. Cir. 26,
2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 220 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), become important as guidance for
other courts. Also not all of those cases are reported.
101. See Mobilisa, Inc., 107 P.3d at 719 (adopting the balancing test as one
prong of a slightly different test that has many elements of Cahill and Dendrite);
Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008) (acknowledging neither
test, but essentially following the Cahill example and leaving out the balancing
portion); Ottinger v. Journal News, 36 Med. L. Rptr. 2018, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
4579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (using the balancing standard prong to allow an identity
to be revealed).
102. Ottinger, 36 Med. L. Rptr. 2018, 2020, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4579.
103. Id.
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"AK47" could be revealed in the AutoAdmit case.'°4 The Court
acknowledged the importance of the balancing analysis and argued:
"This balancing analysis ensures that the First Amendment rights of
anonymous Internet speakers are not lost unnecessarily, and that
plaintiffs do not use discovery to 'harass, intimidate or silence critics in
the public forum opportunities presented by the Internet"' (quoting from
Dendrite).1°5 Yet Judge Droney neglected to apply a separate balancing
analysis. He instead examined: 1) notice; 2) identification of defamatory
statements; 3) whether an alternative means to obtaining the identity of
the speaker exists; 4) whether there is a central need for the identity of
the speaker; 5) the speaker's expectation of privacy at the time of the
posting; and 6) whether plaintiff has made a prima facie case for each
element of the claim against the defendant.10 6 Droney's steps 3, 4, and 5
break out pieces that would be subsumed in a Dendrite analysis, but fail
to weigh the speaker's constitutional right to speak anonymously against
the harm done to the plaintiff if he is allowed to remain masked.
The esteemed judge from the District of Connecticut is not alone
in struggling with how to handle this conflict. A Montana trial court
recently side-stepped the constitutional issues raised by potentially
defamatory anonymous internet speech when it found an answer to the
quandary in the state's shield law.' °7 In that case, a failed candidate for
political office had sued his rival for defamation. As part of the suit, he
sought the identities of anonymous commenters on the Billings Gazette's
website, some of which he thought belonged to his rival. 108 The judge
applied Montana's shield law, which protects news organizations and
anyone connected to the news organization for the "purpose[s] of
gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating news."' 09
104. DoeI, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249.
105. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 254-55.
107. Samantha Frederickson, Anonymous bloggers protected by shield law,
judge finds, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PREss, Sept. 4, 2008,
'http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6964. (As of April 1, 2009, the case
had not yet been reported in either the Media Law Reporter or a regional reporter.)
108. Greg Tuttle, Judge: Law protects anonymous newspaper commenters,
BILINGs GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2008/09/
03/news/local/22-doty.txt.
109. Frederickson, supra note 107.
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That decision was surely welcomed by the Gazette, but it will
not do much good the next time a Montana court is wrestling with an
anonymous commenter unless that comment happened to have been left
on a website owned by a news organization. Two other courts, one in
Oregon and one in Florida, followed that lead a few weeks later and used
state shield laws to protect anonymous commenters on news websites as
well."'
When the California Court of Appeals took up a similar case, it
opted to craft a test similar to Cahill. In Krinsky, the Court made a two
part test that mimics Cahill with the major difference being how it
describes the second prong. 11 The Krinsky court shied away from
calling it a "summary judgment" standard: "We find it unnecessary and
potentially confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary
judgment or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a plaintiff
seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet."' 2 Rather
the Court described it as a requirement that plaintiff make a prima facie
showing of the elements of libel, 13 which accomplishes the same effect
as the second prong of Cahill.
A NEW TEST EMERGES
Yet another court to take up this issue, post-Cahill, opted to craft
its own standard that includes the balancing arm"14 but that is different
from Dendrite because it combines the second and third parts of that
court's test. When the Arizona Court of Appeals First Division attempted
to apply Cahill or Dendrite, it found both tests lacking." 5 "[W]e
110. Sam Bayard, Oregon Shield Law Protects Anonymous Commenter,
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/
oregon-shield-law-protects-anonymous-commenter; Eric David, Courts Grapple
with Anonymous Web Site Posters as "Sources, " THE NEWSROOM LAW BLOG, Dec.
29, 2008, http://www.newsroomlawblog.com/2008/12/articles/shield-laws/courts-
grapple-with-anonymous-web-site-posters-as-sources/.
111. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1170, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231,
244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1172, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245.
114. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 715-19.
115. Id.
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conclude that courts should utilize a single test in deciding whether to
grant or deny a request to discover the identity of an anonymous internet
speaker,"'"16 Judge Timmer wrote for a 2-1 majority. 1 7 The court then
proceeded to lay out a new test, cobbled from both Cahill and Dendrite.
The Arizona court retained the notice requirement found in each. "A
court should not consider impacting a speaker's First Amendment rights
without affording the speaker an opportunity to respond to the discovery
request."' 18
The court rejected plaintiffs requests for more lax, pre-Cahill
and pre-Dendrite standards. "We agree with the Cahill court that
requiring a plaintiff to merely set forth a prima facie claim (Sony Music)
or survive a motion to dismiss (Seescandy.com) would set the bar too
low, chilling potential speakers from speaking anonymously on the
internet."11 9 Instead, the court picked up the second part of the Cahill
standard: requiring the requesting party's cause of action to be able to
survive a motion for summary judgment. "0 The court then stepped away
from Cahill and drew on the Dendrite decision to craft its final prong:
"[W]e disagree with [the Cahill] court's conclusion that a balancing step
is unnecessary.' 12' The court argued that it is needed in order to account
for the "vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve anonymous
speech."
, 122
[W]ithout a balancing step, the superior court would
not be able to consider factors such as the type of
speech involved, the speakers expectation of
privacy, the potential consequence of a discovery
order to the speaker and others similarly situated, the
need for the identity of the speaker to advance the
requesting party's position, and the availability of
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 720 (referencing Sony Music Ent. Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp.
2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) and Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573
(N.D. Cal. 1999)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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alternative discovery methods. Requiring the court
to consider and weigh these factors, and a myriad of
other potential factors, would provide the court with
the flexibility needed to ensure a proper balance is
reached between the parties' competing interests on
a case-by-case basis."'
The test that emerged from Mobilisa has the familiar features of
Cahill and Dendrite, yet it is its own. To satisfy the test, the party that
wishes to obtain an anonymous internet speaker's identity must show,
first, that the speaker has been notified adequately and has had a
reasonable opportunity to respond to the discovery request. Second, the
underlying cause of action has to be able to survive a motion for
summary judgment on elements not dependent on the speaker's identity.
Lastly, a balance of the parties competing interests must still favor
disclosure.
124
By retaining the balancing prong, the Mobilisa court gave itself a
safety valve to prevent valuable, constitutionally protected speech from
being hampered by plaintiffs. It is important to take notice that the reason
the Arizona court found the balancing test necessary was because the
court envisioned a wide-array of fact patterns in which the question
would arise, and it recognized the need for a mechanism to deal with
those situations on a case-by-case basis.
PROS AND CONS OF THE BALANCING PRONG
The first argument against the balancing prong is laid out fairly
succinctly in Cahill:125 if a test is utilized that requires a claim to survive
a summary judgment analysis, then the First Amendment rights of the
speaker will necessarily be taken into account.126 This argument fails to
consider the possibility that a plaintiff in some situations may be able to
survive summary judgment, even though the harm done by revealing the
speaker's identity may far outweigh the damage of the libel.
123. Id. (citing Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 761).
124. Id.
125. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
126. Id. at 460.
2009] 439
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
In Mobilisa, Judge David Barker offered an interesting dissent in
which he argued that the balancing test should be used after examination
of whether the plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact
on each element of the claim, other than identity, only in limited
• 127
circumstances. In Barker's view, when the person whose identity is
sought is also the defendant, then the balancing test risks taking away the
plaintiffs right to redress even after he or she has shown that there is a
genuine issue of material fact and the claim can survive the First
Amendment. 
128
The balancing prong is essentially a last-gap measure to ensure
that an anonymous speaker's First Amendment right to withhold his or
her identity is not lightly impinged in order to allow a plaintiff to move
forward in a civil suit. 129 As Professors Lidsky and Cotter argue, "[T]he
defendant should have a final opportunity to convince the judge, in
camera, that the magnitude of harm she faces if her identity is revealed
outweighs the plaintiffs need for her identity."'1 30  Without this
opportunity to make a last-gasp argument that the harm will outweigh the
good, an anonymous speaker runs a huge risk of being unmasked.
The AutoAdmit case offers a real world example. The
supposedly libelous statement attributed to "AK47" that Judge Droney
said was enough to make a prima facie showing of libel is as follows:
"Alex Atkind, Stephen Reynolds, [Doe II], and me: GAY LOVERS.""13
(Doe II is one of the plaintiffs in the case.) Droney decided that it was
defamatory because "any discussion of Doe II's sexual behavior on the
internet tends to lower her reputation in the community, particular in the
case of any potential employers who might search for her name
online." There is a strong argument that Judge Droney's defamation
analysis is faulty, and many courts have declined to find an accusation of
127. Mobilisa Inc., 170 P.3d at 725 ("I have no disagreement with an
additional balancing .. .when the anonymous speaker is someone other than the
defendant").
128. Id. at 725-726.
129. See Lidsky and Cotter, supra note 81, at 1601.
130. Id.
13 1. Doe Iv. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 (D. Conn. 2008).
132. Id.
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homosexuality as a statement that harms one's reputation.' Setting
those aside, the libel claim in this statement is essentially that the poster
accused the plaintiff of being a "gay lover." If that is libelous, it is
certainly not a claim that is bound to significantly damage one's
reputation, even if false, in an employment context, which was the crux
of Judge Droney's concern. In fact, many employers view diversity of
employees as a benefit. Perhaps the sentence could be interpreted another
way, that Doe II was sexually promiscuous with three other people. That
construction raises a question of whether plaintiff can make a prima facie
showing that it is defamatory as well, as courts have struggled to keep up
with society's changing sexual mores and deciding whether an allegation
of promiscuity is defamatory.'34
What is clear is revealing the poster's identity is surely going to
cause him great harm, as the specific poster is known for racist
comments on the site and his "outing" has been anticipated on several
legal blogs. 135 The fear of having the veil of anonymity lifted appears to
be powerful in the AutoAdmit case. As of mid-February 2009, four of
the pseudonymous defendants had settled, with only one having his
identity revealed in court documents. 136
A TEST THAT UPHOLDS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Several of the courts that have dealt with this issue are on the
right path with the use of a balancing prong, but the question remains
open as to what a strong test that upholds First Amendment principles
should look like. Mobilisa came the closest to answering this question.
133. See Finebaum v. Coulter, 854 So. 2d 1120 (Ala. 2003); Donovan v.
Fiumara, 114 N.C. App. 524 (N.C. App. 1994); Hayes v. Smith 832 P.2d 1022 (Col.
Ct. App. 1991); Dally v. Orange County Publications, 117 A.D. 2d 577 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. App. 1986); contra Q-Tone Broadcasting Co. v. Musicradio, 1994 Del. Super.
LEXIS 453 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994).
134. Elizabeth Soja, Unchaste no longer?, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW,
http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/3 1- 1/lib-unchaste.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
135. See AboveTheLaw.com, AutoAdmit Tag, http://abovethelaw.com/auto
admitxoxohth/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); Marc Randazza, AutoAdmit Update,
The Legal Satyricon, http://randazza.wordpress.com/2008/06/23/auto-admit-update/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
136. See Margolick, supra note 5.
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Notice: Clearly the anonymous speaker needs the opportunity to
respond to the pleadings in the case before his or her identity has been
handed over. Most of the courts looking at this issue see the value in
notice and require notice at some level, whether it is posting a message in
the forum where the speech was made, or when possible, sending notice
through the speaker's internet service provider.' 37 As the Cahill court
said, "[t]he notification provision imposes very little burden on a
defamation plaintiff while at the same time giving an anonymous
defendant the opportunity to respond.'
138
Summary judgment: After providing notice, the plaintiff should
have to show a likelihood of success on each element of the claim, strong
enough that the pleadings can survive a motion for summary judgment,
before the anonymous speaker can be unmasked. "Requiring the
requesting party to satisfy this step furthers the goal of compelling
identification of anonymous internet speakers only as a means to redress
legitimate misuses of speech rather than as a means to retaliate against or
chill legitimate speech,"' 39 the Arizona court said in Mobilisa.
Balancing: The third, and most important piece, is the balancing
arm. The presumption should be in favor of a speaker remaining
anonymous and should only be overcome when the harm to the plaintiff
in not unveiling the anonymous speaker far outweighs the harm done to
the speaker by revealing her identity. By setting the bar that high, the
courts afford the greatest amount of constitutional protection to
anonymous internet speakers, while not precluding plaintiffs from
making a showing that they have been harmed. To go back to the
AutoAdmit case, it would prevent a plaintiff from using the threat of
identifying a speaker, such as AK47, at the negotiating table without first
making a basic showing that she can succeed on the underlying
defamation claim.
137. See Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006), Doe v. Cahill, 884
A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d
231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007),
Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
138. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
139. Mobilisa, Inc., 170 P.3d at 720.
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The Mobilisa court wanted the balancing test because of the
flexibility it provides to examine each situation on a case-by-case
basis. 140 The court is right to seize on that aspect of the balancing test
because it foresees a potentially broad array of fact patterns that can
confound these cases. This proposed test is essentially what the Arizona
Court of Appeals came to, except it leans more heavily toward the
speaker remaining anonymous. The reason to tip the scale in that
direction is as much rooted in our society's historic use of anonymous
speech' 41 as it is in the faith that the marketplace of ideas will self-correct
false speech. Just as members of an advocacy group have a First
Amendment-rooted right to withhold their identities from the
government,14 people who participate in protected speech on a message
forum may have an interest in withholding their identities, in order to
foster a broader, less restrained discussion. When the threat of later being
identified exists, without a strong presumption in favor of keeping the
speaker's identity hidden, it has a chilling effect on the speaker. The
speaker who called himself AK47 has stopped posting at the AutoAdmit
site, at least under that moniker, since his identity was handed over to the
plaintiffs, even though the defamation claim against him is suspect at
best.
CONCLUSION
Lack of uniformity in determining when to unmask anonymous
internet speakers is creating problems in lower courts. No one standard
appears to be winning favor, and each jurisdiction that takes up the issue
is putting its own stamp on the problem. There are two lines of cases that
share common themes,one that draws its inspiration from Cahill (without
a balancing test) and the other from Dendrite (with a balancing test).
Neither the Cahill line (California, Delaware, and Wisconsin) nor the
Dendrite line (Arizona, Maryland and New Jersey) in the six appellate
courts that have so far published opinions on the issue, has gained a
140. Id.
141. McIntyre, supra note 15.
142. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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majority. And even then, those courts can not agree on what form the
tests should take.
The courts that are following Dendrite's lead and including some
form of balancing test are the ones that are closest to the answer. They
are upholding the First Amendment's long history of protecting
anonymous speech. Yet even if courts move away from the balancing
arm, it is important for internet users to have some understanding of
when they are likely to be identified for their words and when they are
not. The lack of conformity among the courts is a particularly
compounding problem when it is applied to the internet, which is not
inherently borderless but is able to reach into so many different
jurisdictions with relative ease.143
143. JACK GOLDSMITH AND TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 49-63 (2008).
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